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A ﬁrst step towards meeting Indonesia’s ambition for universal health insurance was made in 2005 with
the introduction of the Askeskin programme, a subsidized social health insurance targeted to the informal
sector and the poor. This paper investigates targeting and impact of the Askeskin programme using panel
data for 8582 households observed in 2005 and 2006, and applying difference-in-differences estimation
in combination with propensity score matching. We ﬁnd that the programme is indeed targeted to the
poor and those most vulnerable to catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments. Social health insurance
improves access to health care in that it increases utilization of outpatient among the poor, while out-of-
pocket spending seems to have increased for Askeskin insured in urban areas.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
A ﬁrst step towards meeting Indonesia’s ambition for universal
health insurance was made with comprehensive public health
sector reforms in 2005, as social health insurance was expanded to
the informal sector and the poor. This nationwide social health
insurance for the poor (Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Keluarga Miskin e
Askeskin) intended to complement social health insurance schemes
for public and formal private sector employees. But whereas the
formal sector schemes are based on mandatory earnings-related
contributions, the premiums for Askeskin were fully subsidized by
a government health fund. Under the programme, households
receive comprehensive insurance coverage for public health care,
including inpatient and outpatient services.
Although the public health sector had been heavily subsided,
with targeted price subsidies to the poor since the economic crisis
of 1998 (e.g. Pradhan, Saadah, & Sparrow, 2007), health care utili-
zation and public spending in Indonesia falls behind its South-East
Asian neighbours, while inequality in health care utilization in the
country is relatively high (O’Donnell et al., 2007). This inequality is
of particular concern in light of Indonesia’s adoption of ﬁscal andnt of Economics, Crawford
ersity, Canberra, ACT 0200,
robert.sparrow@anu.edu.au
Y-NC-ND license.(partly) political decentralisation in 2001, under which regime
public service delivery is now largely dominated by district
administrations. As a result, large variation in district public
revenue implies larger variation in public spending (Kruse,
Pradhan, & Sparrow, 2012).
The combination of low utilization rates and high inequality
may explain the observed patterns in private health spending. Out-
of-pocket (OOP) health payments are relatively low compared to
other Asian countries, as they account for 1.83 percent of total
household spending on average. However, this apparent low
propensity to spend is accompanied by a high variation across the
population, with the non-poor allocating a larger share of their
budget on OOP spending (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007).
The key objective of Askeskin was to improve access to health
care and provide ﬁnancial protection to health shocks and illness
for poor households that lack access to formal insurance. With
limited insurance coverage, the cost of required health care can
have implications for both transient poverty and long term poverty
traps if households are resource and credit constrained. For
example, if health payments are ﬁnanced out of current income, but
smoothing is imperfect, this may lead to increased transient
poverty. On the other hand, if OOP payments cannot be completely
ﬁnanced through current income, households may resort to tradi-
tional coping strategies, such as depletion of assets and buffer
stocks, or utilize social networks and incur debt (e.g. De Weerdt &
Dercon, 2006; Flores, Krishnakumar, O’Donnel, & Van Doorslaer,
2008). Such strategies can have long term negative effects for
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A third possibility would be to forgo treatment altogether, which
may have long term consequences through reduced health and
depreciation of human capital. Previous studies for Indonesia have
indeed shown that with limited access to credit markets, house-
holds employ alternative coping mechanisms (Sumarto, Suryahadi,
& Bazzi, 2008). However, while small idiosyncratic shocks seem
insurable, full insurance is often not feasible (Sumarto, Suryahadi, &
Widyanti, 2005). Moreover, when faced with covariate shocks and
chronic illness, coping mechanisms are ineffective and informal
insurance fails (e.g. Gertler & Gruber, 2002).
In general, the empirical literature suggests that health insur-
ance can be effective in increasing utilization and reducing OOP
health spending, although the evidence is sometimes mixed. For
example, Wagstaff and Pradhan (2006) ﬁnd that the introduction of
social health insurance in Vietnam during the 1990s has decreased
OOP and catastrophic health spending, while increasing utilization
and improving health outcomes. They argue that by reducing
ﬁnancial risk, households had to rely less on coping mechanisms
such as savings. On the other hand, Wagstaff (2010) ﬁnds no impact
of Vietnam’s recent health care fund for the poor on utilization,
although it does seem to have reduced OOP health spending. For
rural China, Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, and Juncheng (2009) ﬁnd
positive effects of a voluntary health insurance scheme on the use
of health services between 2003 and 2005, but ﬁnd no effect on
OOP. Moreover, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) show that in urban
China health insurance has in fact increased OOP and catastrophic
payments, which they attribute to a combination of increased
utilization and behavioural responses by health care providers.
Studies in Latin America ﬁnd evidence of decreased OOP health
payments and catastrophic health care spending in Mexico due to
the Seguro Popular health insurance for the poor (Galárraga, Sosa-
Rubí, Salinas, & Sesma, 2008), and increased health care utiliza-
tion in Colombia due to subsidized health insurance for the poor
(Giedion, 2007; Trujillo, Portillo, & Vernon, 2005) and mandatory
contributory based health insurance for the non-poor (Giedion,
Alfonso, & Díaz, 2007). For Indonesia, Hidayat, Thabrany, Dong,
and Sauerborn (2004) ﬁnd a positive effect of mandatory formal
sector health insurance on utilization of outpatient care in the
1990s. Pradhan et al. (2007) ﬁnd that targeted user fee waivers
helped protect access to health care for the poor during Indonesia’s
economic crisis in 1999.
This paper contributes to the empirical evidence by examining
how the Askeskin programme has affected access to health care
and associated ﬁnancial risk for the poor. We will ﬁrst analyse
targeting of Askeskin and how it reaches those most in need of
ﬁnancial protection. We deﬁne need by the level of expected
required health spending of households, given a demographic
proﬁle and health status. We then proceed with estimating the
impact of Askeskin on outpatient utilization and OOP health
payments. The analysis is based on a panel of 8582 households
conducted in 2005 and 2006. The ﬁrst wave of the survey was
conducted just before the start of Askeskin, hence providing
a baseline. Identiﬁcation of treatment effects relies on a differ-
ence-in-differences approach combined with propensity score
matching.
We ﬁnd that the programme is indeed targeted to the poor and
those most vulnerable to OOP health payments. Askeskin has
improved access to health care in that it increases utilization of
public outpatient care. We do not ﬁnd evidence of substitution
effects from private to public care, while there does seem to be
a positive impact on OOP payments in urban areas.
The next section sets the context and describes the Askeskin
programme. Section 3 then describes the data andmethods used for
theanalysis. Section4presents theresults,whileSection5concludes.Social insurance in Indonesia
Formal sector
At the time Askeskinwas to be introduced, around 10 percent of
the Indonesian population was covered by social health insurance
(ILO, 2008), through mandatory health insurance for civil servants
(Asuransi Kesehatan e Askes), the police and military (Asurasi Sosial
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia e Asabri) and the formal
private sector (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja e Jamsostek). For all
three schemes the premiums for beneﬁciaries are related to earn-
ings but not to the beneﬁts. The Askes and Asabri schemes are
similar in design and beneﬁt package, where the beneﬁciary
contributions are matched by the government. Premiums for Jam-
sostek are paid by the employers, and enrolment is mandatory for
ﬁrms in the formal private sector with at least 10 workers or a pay
roll of at least than 1 million Rupiah per month. However, ﬁrms
may opt out of Jamsostek in favour of private health insurance if this
yields higher insurance beneﬁts. Private health insurance and other
schemes covered around 3 percent of the population, and
community based insurance less than a percent (Rokx, Schieber,
Harimurti, Tandon, & Somanathan, 2009).
Formal insurance coverage remained limited as the informal
sector, making up more than 60 percent of the labour force, was
excluded from social health insurance. Before the Askeskin insur-
ance scheme was introduced, the most prominent health ﬁnancing
programme for the poor was the Social Safety Net (SSN) health card
scheme, which was implemented in 1998 as a response to the
economic crisis. This programme involved targeted fee waivers and
was of a much smaller scale than Askeskin. Reimbursement for
public health care providers was not tied to services delivered to
health card holders, but consisted of block grants based on the
estimated number of poor households in the catchment area.
Informal sector: the Askeskin programme
The Askeskin health insurance programme was introduced with
the objective to expand social security to the informal sector,
aiming at a target population of 60 million people. The insurance
includes basic outpatient care, inpatient care in third class wards at
public hospitals, an obstetric service package, mobile health
services and special services for remote areas and islands, immu-
nization programmes, and medicines. Hospitals could submit
claims for services delivered to Askeskin beneﬁciaries based on fee
for service, while primary health centres were compensated on
capitation basis. Although it was initially the intention to cover
private health services as well, only a third of the private health care
providers accept Askeskin insurance. Resources and risk were
pooled at the district level, with monthly premiums of Rp. 5000
fully subsidized by the government. The total annual budget for
2005 was set at Rp. 3.9 trillion, (approximately USD 400 million),
initially ﬁnanced through the energy subsidy reductions (Aran,
2007; ILO, 2008).
Targeting of Askeskin beneﬁciaries was based on a combination
of geographic (district) targeting and selection of eligible individ-
uals within districts. The district budgets quota for Askeskin
participants were determined based on district poverty indicators
provided by BPS. Districts then identiﬁed eligible individuals, using
census based welfare and poverty indicators from BPS or the Family
Planning Board.
Qualitative studies on the implementation of Askeskin high-
lighted a number of shortcomings in the ﬁrst year. Ariﬁanto,
Budiyati, Marianti, and Tan (2005) report that some individuals
declined Askeskin insurance. Although allocation of Askeskin was
based on individual coverage, the targeting process identiﬁed
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entitled to receive Askeskin coverage. In practice, however,
accepting Askeskin involved indirect costs as recipients had to pay
for photographs that would appear on their Askeskin insurance
cards. Some household therefore opted for partial coverage, with
only some household members registering for Askeskin. They also
ﬁnd anecdotal evidence suggesting Askeskin ﬁnanced care is
sometimes perceived as being of inferior quality to that received by
self-paying patients, and that not all services in the Askeskin beneﬁt
package are actually delivered. Bachtiar, Wibisana, and Pujiyanto
(2006) claim that explanation of procedures to beneﬁciaries,
administrative procedures and responsibilities for health care
providers was lacking. They also found that indirect costs are not
covered and that travel distance still remains a barrier, despite the
programmes support to mobile health services. This is a problem
that was also observed hindering impact of the SSN health card
(Pradhan et al., 2007; Sparrow, 2008).
Data and methods
Data
This analysis draws on a national socioeconomic survey (Suse-
nas), conducted for a panel of Indonesian households in 2005 and
2006 by Statistics Indonesia (BPS). The 2005 wave of the panel
includes 10,575 households that were subsequently revisited in
2006, yielding a balanced panel of 8582 households. The surveys
were conducted around February, providing a baseline survey 4e5
months prior to the introduction of Askeskin in July 2005, and
a post-intervention survey in 2006. We also use data from the
annual Susenas cross section survey of 2006 on Askeskin coverage to
districts. This survey is ﬁelded in the same period as the household
panel, but is conducted for a different and larger sample of 277,202
households, representative at the district level.
The survey collects information on the socioeconomic status of
households, self-reported morbidity, health care utilization, and
participation in public and private health insurance schemes and
other social programmes. The survey also includes a detailed
expenditure module, for both food and non-food items. For thisTable 1
Descriptive statistics Susenas household panel 2005e2006, balanced panel and attrition
Balanced household panel
2005
Mean Stand. dev.
Per capita expenditure
(Indonesian Rp.)
259,168 230,920
Per capita health expenditure
(Indonesian Rp.)
5601 21,344
Age 28.28 19.43
Female 0.50 0.50
Household size 4.77 1.79
Female head of household 0.08 0.28
No education 0.45 0.50
Primary education 0.26 0.44
Junior secondary education 0.13 0.34
Senior secondary education 0.13 0.33
Higher education 0.03 0.17
Illness in last month disrupted
work/schooling
0.18 0.38
Nr. of outpatient visits in last month 0.19 0.76
Access to Askeskin
Participates in Askes 0.07 0.25
Participates in Jamsostek 0.03 0.16
Number of individuals 34,825
Number of households 8582analysis we use all reported health expenditures (excluding health
insurance premiums) as measure for out-of-pocket payments for
health care.We restrict the analysis of utilization to outpatient care,
as the reported frequency of inpatient care is too low for a robust
empirical analysis, in particular for the poorest quartile of the
sample. Descriptive statistics for the main variables are provided in
Table 1. The ﬁnal columns show the characteristics of the house-
holds in 2005 that were lost in constructing the balanced panel.
Although the rate of attrition is sizable, there seem to be no
systematic differences between the sub-samples. The households
that were dropped in 2006 have slightly higher income and
education, but are almost identical in health care utilization. In
addition, we further test for attrition bias by regressing the main
outcome variables for the full 2005 sample of individuals on
a constant and a dummy variable indicating whether a household
appears in the 2006 sample. In all regressions the coefﬁcients are
not statistically signiﬁcant (see the Supplementary appendix for
the results).
Methods
Targeting of Askeskin to the poor and those in need of ﬁnancial
protection
To investigate the targeting of Askeskinwe look at how Askeskin
coverage has been allocated to the poor and to those households
that are expected to require a relatively high health spending
budget share in order to meet their health care needs.
For obvious reasons, the variation in OOP health spending may
not reﬂect difference in exposure to adverse health shocks; rather,
it is likely to reﬂect a combination of health care needs and
affordability. Therefore we will look at the potential exposure to
idiosyncratic health spending events in terms of the expected OOP
payments one would require in order to obtain some reference
level of health care. Pradhan and Prescott (2002) propose a method
to derive the distribution of expected required health spending
from the observed distribution, given a demographic proﬁle of
households. This distribution lets spending vary by age and gender,
standardized at some level of per capita general spending. That is,
this approach assumes that required health care is determined by.
Attrition
2006 2005
Mean Stand. dev. Mean Stand. dev.
285,947 241,692 294,079 226,354
6105 47,983 5607 14,988
28.92 19.78 27.11 18.51
0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50
4.75 1.80 4.64 1.84
0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29
0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49
0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43
0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36
0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37
0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36
0.15 0.75 0.19 0.91
0.12 0.32
0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27
0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
34,525 7693
8582 1993
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the level of income. However, if health status would vary by income
then the derived distribution of health spending needs would be
misleading if health status would be ignored. We therefore include
a variable indicating that a household member has been ill such
that it has disrupted work or school in the month prior to the
survey.
Using a tobit speciﬁcation, we regress actual (pre-Askeskin) per
capita household OOP spending in 2005 on household size and
composition, per capita household expenditure, the disruptive illness
indicator, formal sector health insurance and targeted fee waivers,
and a set of urban/rural-province interaction terms. The interaction
terms capture regional differences in price and supply of health care.
The tobit coefﬁcients are then used to predict OOP health spending
per capita for households in 2005 and 2006, with household expen-
diture ﬁxed at the 90th percentile and the location at Jakarta. That is,
OOPRh ¼ E

OOP
Dh;Hh;HIh; PCE ¼ q90; L ¼ Jakarta

(1)
which we interpret as the expected required OOP health spending
for a household, given its demographic proﬁle (D) and health status
(H), but with the level of wealth (PCE) of the 90th per capita
expenditure percentile, without formal sector health insurance or
fee waivers (HI) and facing health care supply similar to that found
in the capital Jakarta (L). The choice of expenditure reference point
is arbitrary.We choose the 90th percentile as we assume that this is
a level of wealth at which (most) health care needs can be met,
while Jakarta is chosen since it has the most comprehensive health
care supply in the country. The predicted OOP spending can
therefore not be interpreted independently, but is merely used as
a relative measure. The 2006 predictions are adjusted for inﬂation
using the observed changes in median per capita household
spending from 2005 to 2006.
Impact of Askeskin on health care utilization and spending
We investigate the impact of Askeskin on access to health care, in
terms of health care utilization, OOP health spending and budget
shares and incidence of catastrophic spending (deﬁned as OOP
health spending that exceeds 15 percent of total household
spending). A key empirical problem that hampers the impact
analysis of health insurance is the simultaneous nature of insurance
uptake and demand for health care. Enrolment into Askeskin is not
random, but determined by targeting and individual compliance to
initial assignment. It is therefore not straightforward to discern
causal effects from the correlation between health insurance
coverage on health care utilization.
To identify the impact of Askeskinwe exploit the panel structure
of the data and the fact that 2005 provides us a baseline at which
time Askeskinwas not yet introduced, by combining a difference-in-
differences approach with propensity score matching. As outcome
variables we use the average number of outpatient visits by
householdmembers and the household budget share of OOP health
spending in the last month. We differentiate between overall
utilization and that of the main public health care providers (public
health centres and hospitals).
We take a difference-in-differences approach, by comparing
households with and without Askeskin before and after it was
introduced
bDD ¼ E

yh;2006  yh;2005
A ¼ 1

 E

yh;2006  yh;2005
A ¼ 0

(2)
We then estimate difference regressions in order to control for
a set of time variant covariatesDyht ¼ bDD’DAht þ gDXht þ drt þ Dεht (3)
The treatment variable Aht ¼ 1 if household h enjoys Askeskin
insurance coverage in year t, and Aht ¼ 0 otherwise. Time invariant
factors such as the main selection criteria, latent health status,
health care preferences, and static socioeconomic characteristics
are eliminated in this setup. Difference regression (3) also includes
control variables (Xht) for changes in household size and compo-
sition, education of the head of households, participation in other
insurance schemes and housing conditions (house ownership, ﬂoor
area and access to piped water). Regional targeting is captured by
Askeskin coverage in districts. We further control for aggregate
unobserved shocks, which we allow to vary by province (drt), while
idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be randomly distributed.
We combine the difference-in-differences approach with
propensity score matching
bPSM ¼ E

yh;2006  yh;2005
Ah ¼ 1; Sh ¼ 1

 E

Wh

yh;2006  yh;2005
Ah ¼ 0; Sh ¼ 1

ð4Þ
where Wh ¼ W(P(Xh)) is a weight based on the estimated propen-
sity score P(Xh) and the matching method, and S reﬂects the range
of common support. The advantage of propensity score matching
over difference-in-differences is that that we can control for
observed characteristics that determine Askeskin enrolment,
without imposing a functional form on y. In addition, the matching
procedure restricts the analysis to the range of common support.
The propensity score is predicted based on logit estimates of the
probability that a household enjoys Askeskin coverage in 2006 as
a function of the 2005 values of the control variables used in Eq. (3),
and per capita quartile dummy variables to capture for targeting on
initial income level. Matching is based on an Epanechnikov kernel
with a 0.06 bandwidth, with bootstrapped standard errors (200
replications). We also estimated the impacts for different band-
widths and by matching treated households to the 5 nearest
neighbours, but the results are not sensitive to alternative
approaches (see the Supplementary appendix for details).
Both approaches rest on the identifying assumption that
unobserved shocks do not drive health care utilization as well as
affecting targeting of Askeskin. There are, however, two potential
confounding time variant unobservables that we need to consider.
The ﬁrst is an unobserved health shock, which would affect the
demand for health services and the likelihood of receiving Askeskin
coverage, as a rapid assessment by Bachtiar et al. (2006) suggests
that Askeskin was sometimes allocated based on health status.
Ignoring latent health status could therefore lead us to over-
estimate the impact of Askeskin.
To control for health status we could include the self-reported
disruptive illness variable in the difference regressions and the
propensity score function. There are, however, two problems with
this variable. First, it is a potential outcome variable itself, and
endogenous to the other outcome variables and Askeskin. Second, it
is subject to reporting bias and unobserved heterogeneity in
perceptions of health status, which may be related to affordability
of care and therefore also to insurance status Askeskin.
For these reasons, we do not include self-reported illness for
2006 in our preferred speciﬁcations. Instead, we scrutinize the size
of the potential bias and assess the robustness of our results to
selection on acute need. We ﬁrst include the self-reported illness
variable as sensitivity analysis in the difference regressions. This
should give us some indication of the extent of the bias due to
unobserved health shocks. Moreover, in such a short time span,
latent perceptions of health status are unlikely to change severely
due to unobserved factors other than a health shock; hence,
Table 3
Distribution of out-of-pocket health expenditure budget shares and incidence of
R. Sparrow et al. / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 264e271268household ﬁxed effects should capture most effects from reporting
bias.
In the propensity score function we do include the 2005 self-
reported disruptive illness variable, in order to capture initial
health status. To assess the scope for bias due to changes in health
status, we calculate Rosenbaum bounds for our treatment effects, as
proposed by DiPrete and Gangl (2004). This test gives an indication
of the extent of hidden bias that is required in order to undermine
interpretation of the propensity score estimates. We ﬁnd that the
results are robust to potential bias from health shocks. Selection on
needs seems to be largely determined by latent health status, which
is eliminated by ﬁrst differencing.
Alternative targeted poverty programmes are another form of
shock that could lead to confounding effects of the different
schemes, for example if these schemes share local targeting
mechanisms. In case of Askeskin, a potential confounding factor is
the launch of a nationwide unconditional cash transfer programme
(UCT) in the second half of 2005, targeted speciﬁcally to the poor. If
Askeskin is targeted to UCT recipients, then the impact estimates
could be picking up the income effect from the UCT scheme. The
Susenas survey collects information on UCT receipts by households,
reporting 26.3 percent coverage among households. The correla-
tion coefﬁcient of Askeskin and UCT coverage (at household level
and applying household sampling weights) is 0.344. Among
households with at least one member participating in Askeskin 67.9
percent received UCT as well, while 30.3 of UCT households
beneﬁted from Askeskin health insurance coverage. Hence there is
some non-trivial overlap between both programmes, and we
include a UCT treatment dummy variable to control for this. Due to
some missing observations for the UCT variable, the sample size is
reduced to 8448 households in the balanced panel.
Finally, there may be intra-household spill-over effects, as
providing one householdmember with Askeskin coveragewill relax
the budget constraint for the entire household; for example, when
Askeskin coverage is assigned to the householdmembermost prone
to catastrophic health events or with a history of health problems.
Therefore we estimate the impact with the household as unit of
analysis, by taking the average utilization by the household
members as outcome variable and a binary treatment variable
indicating presence of a householdmemberwith Askeskin coverage.
Results
Health care utilization and OOP health payments in Indonesia: is
there a scope for public intervention?
Utilization of outpatient health care in 2005 and 2006 is pre-
sented in Table 2. The table shows the number of outpatient visits in
the last month at public and private health care providers, by per
capita expenditure quartile and urban/rural location.Table 2
Utilization of outpatient (number of visits in last month) at public and private health
care providers, Susenas household panel 2005e2006.
Outpatient care All providers Public Private
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Quartile 1
(poorest)
0.1655 0.1217 0.0787 0.0654 0.0746 0.0423
Quartile 2 0.1808 0.1587 0.0764 0.0758 0.0959 0.0657
Quartile 3 0.1980 0.1605 0.0820 0.0577 0.1043 0.0897
Quartile 4
(richest)
0.2089 0.1596 0.0671 0.0528 0.1302 0.0992
Urban 0.1861 0.1422 0.0717 0.0565 0.1022 0.0753
Rural 0.1861 0.1544 0.0803 0.0696 0.0957 0.0693
Total 0.1861 0.1486 0.0765 0.0634 0.0986 0.0721
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005e2006 household panel.The general pattern is that utilization of outpatient care
increases with the level of welfare. About a third of the visits occur
at public health centres. The pro-rich pattern is driven by differ-
ences in private care, which is traditionally highly skewed towards
the non-poor. Utilization of public care is more evenly distributed
across the expenditure quartiles, decreasing slightly for higher
levels of expenditures. Overall we see a decline in outpatient
utilization, dropping from 0.19 visits per month in 2005 to 0.15 in
2006. This decline can be explained by the fuel subsidy decreases in
March and October 2005, and is observed for all population groups.
Table 3 shows monthly per capita health spending as share of
total per capita spending. Since consumption baskets of the poor
typically have higher food shares, the relative burden of OOP
payments on household budgets may be better reﬂected by the
share of non-food spending (e.g. Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2003).
The table shows expected patterns, also observed in previous
studies on Indonesia (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). Indonesian
households allocate on average about 2 percent of their monthly
expenditures to health care, with higher OOP payments for the rich
and in urban areas. In 2006 the share of OOP payments in total
spending was 2.4 percent for the richest quartile and 1.4 percent for
the poorest quartile, reﬂecting differences in affordability of care
and the propensity to spend between poor and rich. These patterns
in OOP health spending are also observed for the incidence of
catastrophic health spending. On average, for less than 2 percent of
the population OOP health spending exceeds 15 percent of the
household’s budget.
Required OOP in 2005 and 2006 to meet health care needs are
given in Table 4. Unlike the distribution of actual OOP, expected
OOP requirements show a strong pro-poor distribution. In 2006,
OOP spending for a household from the poorest quartile to obtain
a required level of health care would constitute about 10.8 percent
of the total household budget, and 38.3 percent of the non-food
budget, on average. For the richest quartile this is 2.1 and 4.5
percent respectively. Expected required OOP spending relative to
the total budget is about 60 percent higher for households in rural
villages as compared to urban areas. Since the spending regression
controls for urbanerural price differences, this difference is likely to
be due to differences in household composition, with rural
households having a demographic proﬁle that induces relatively
more health care needs.
While recognising the shortcomings of the different measures
that we apply here, the overall evidence is compelling. The pattern
in OOP payments that we observe can be explained on the one hand
by subsidized public health care resulting in relatively low OOP
payments and catastrophic health spending events compared to
other Asian countries, while on the other hand the poor arecatastrophic spending (percentages).
Share of
total spending
Share of
non-food spending
Catastrophic
health spending
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Quartile 1
(poorest)
1.74 1.42 5.17 4.43 0.58 0.44
Quartile 2 1.76 1.81 4.87 4.83 0.56 1.37
Quartile 3 2.17 1.93 5.18 4.51 2.40 1.92
Quartile 4
(richest)
2.67 2.36 5.04 4.26 3.79 2.85
Urban 2.13 1.99 4.62 4.19 1.91 1.97
Rural 2.03 1.78 5.41 4.78 1.68 1.37
Total 2.07 1.88 5.07 4.51 1.78 1.65
Note: Catastrophic spending on health care is deﬁned as out-of-pocket health
expenditure exceeded 15 percent of total household spending. Source: Authors’
analysis based on Susenas 2005e2006 household panel.
Table 6
Allocation of Askeskin with respect to distribution of actual and predicted out-of-
pocket health expenditures (percentages).
OOPa Predicted OOPb
Share of total
spending
Share of
non-food
spending
Share of
total
spending
Share of
non-food
spending
Quartile 1
(low OOP share)
11.90 9.71 5.04 4.25
Quartile 2 10.38 10.71 8.16 8.16
Quartile 3 11.34 12.39 12.36 11.86
Quartile 4
(high OOP share)
13.53 14.36 19.54 20.74
a Quartiles reﬂect the distribution of actual out-of-pocket health expenditure
budget shares in 2005.
b Quartiles reﬂect the distribution of predicted out-of-pocket health expenditure
budget shares for 2006, based on estimates reported in the supplemental appendix,
with per capita expenditure ﬁxed at the 90th percentile and location at Jakarta.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005e2006 household panel.
Table 4
Distribution of predicted out-of-pocket health expenditure budget shares
(percentages).
Share of total spending Share of non-food
spending
2005 2006 2005 2006
Quartile 1
(poorest)
10.93 10.84 37.05 38.26
Quartile 2 6.25 6.18 18.86 18.76
Quartile 3 4.17 4.04 11.27 10.55
Quartile 4
(richest)
2.11 2.06 4.73 4.52
Urban 4.45 4.30 11.50 11.09
Rural 7.17 7.05 23.74 23.94
Total 5.99 5.78 18.43 18.02
Note: Predicted out-of-pocket health expenditures are based on tobit estimates
reported in the supplemental appendix. The tobit linear predictions are truncated at
a lower bound of zero, with per capita expenditure ﬁxed at the 90th percentile and
location at Jakarta. Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005e2006 house-
hold panel.
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tive to their budgets, leading to relative underutilization of health
care, a lower propensity to spend and a higher probability to forgo
needed health care.Targeting
Targeting of Askeskin is presented in Table 5, showing a pro-poor
pattern (following the 2005 quartile deﬁnition). Among the poorest
quartile, 21.6 percent of people enjoy Askeskin coverage, which
accounts for 51.8 percent of all Askeskin participants. About 80
percent of people covered by Askeskin are with the poorest 50
percent of the population. Nevertheless, this also implies some
non-trivial leakage to the non-poor. Askeskin coverage is higher in
rural areas (14.6 percent) than in urban areas (8.6 percent), which
translates to a 65.3 percent rural share in overall Askeskin coverage.
Askeskin is reasonably successful in reaching individuals that
would need relatively high OOP health spending as share of the
overall household budget to obtain the expected required health
care. Table 6 shows coverage of Askeskin for different levels of actual
OOP budget shares and the required equivalent for expected health
care needs. Askeskin is relatively evenly distributed with regard to
actual OOP budgets shares, with the highest coverage for the fourth
OOP quartile (i.e. households with the highest OOP health budget
shares). Differences are more pronounced for health spending as
share of non-food budget. Among the 25 percent of the population
faced with the lowest OOP/non-food budget share, 9.7 percent has
Askeskin coverage, while this increases to 14.4 percent for the 25
percent of the population faced with the highest shares. The
gradient becomes even steeper when we compare AskeskinTable 5
Targeting of Askeskin coverage in 2006 (percentages).
Coverage Share
Quartile 1 (poorest) 21.55 51.79
Quartile 2 12.69 27.46
Quartile 3 7.86 16.11
Quartile 4 (richest) 2.46 4.63
Urban 8.64 34.71
Rural 14.55 65.29
Male 11.79 50.21
Female 11.74 49.79
Total 11.76 100.00
Note: Quartiles are based on 2005 per capita expenditure. Source: Authors’ analysis
based on Susenas 2005e2006 household panel.coverage to the distribution of OOP budget shares required to
obtain expected health care needs. Coverage increases from 5.0
percent for the least needy to 19.5 percent for the most needy.Impact of Askeskin
The estimated treatment effects are presented in Table 7, with
the propensity score matching results in panel A and the results of
the difference regressions in panel B. The table reports the results
for overall utilization, utilization of public and private care sepa-
rately, and by main public health care providers (public health
centres and hospitals). The tables also show the differential impacts
by per capita expenditure quartile and urban/rural. The quartiles
are based on household expenditure in 2005, to ensure that the
observed impact heterogeneity is not confounded by the impact of
Askeskin on household spending. The logit estimates of the
propensity score function and the balancing test are not presented
here, but are reported in the Supplementary appendix. While the
unmatched treated and non-treated samples differ strongly, the
matched samples are balanced in all the variables included in the
propensity score function.
The impact variable is having Askeskin coverage in 2006. Due to
initial problems with disbursing Askeskin insurance cards in the
ﬁrst year of the programme, targeted households could also claim
insurance beneﬁts using a poverty letter (Surat Keterangan Tidak
Mampu e SKTM) issued by village ofﬁcials or out-dated SSN health
cards (Ariﬁanto et al., 2005; Ministry of Health, 2005). Although the
potential health care beneﬁts provided under these schemes in
2005 differ from Askeskin, we do need to control for initial coverage
in the propensity score function or as covariate in the difference
regressions. Failing to do so would result in underestimation of the
true impact of Askeskin. Note that health card coverage in 2005 did
not imply automatic Askeskin coverage in 2006, as there is
considerable variation in participation in both schemes. About half
of the households in our balanced panel with a health card in 2005
were also participating in Askeskin in 2006, and this group consti-
tutes 38 percent of all Askeskin households.
The difference-in-differences and the matching estimates show
similar results, although the latter give slightly larger effects. The
difference results suggest that Askeskin increased outpatient utili-
zation by 0.062 visits per person per month (vppm), while kernel
matching yields an impact of 0.079 vppm. The patterns are very
similar across methods, with the bulk of the impact occurring at
rural public health centres and urban public hospitals. The effect for
rural areas can simply be explained by the fact that public health
Table 7
Impact of Askeskin on health care utilization and health care spending, by population group.
Outpatient utilization Health care spending
All Public Private Public health
centre
Public
hospital
OOP spending
(Ind. Rp.)
OOP
spending
share
Catastrophic
spending
15% share
A. Propensity score matching
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0881* 0.0554** 0.0160 0.0533** 0.0020 459 0.0030 0.0065
Quartile 2 0.0375 0.0558* 0.0097 0.0471* 0.0087 1635* 0.0064* 0.0164
Quartile 3 0.0604 0.0308 0.0539þ 0.0037 0.0271 123 0.0011 0.0003
Quartile 4 (richest) 0.1029 0.0930 0.0382 0.0381 0.0549 37017 0.0072 0.0073
Rural 0.0688* 0.0694** 0.0055 0.0554** 0.0140 128 0.0005 0.0031
Urban 0.1014þ 0.0440 0.0528þ 0.0158 0.0283* 8943 0.0100** 0.0108
Total 0.0789** 0.0612** 0.0214 0.0438** 0.0174 2624 0.0031þ 0.0051
B. Difference-in-differences
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0770* 0.0563** 0.0113 0.0487** 0.0076 504 0.0031 0.0091
Quartile 2 0.0232 0.0550** 0.0002 0.0458** 0.0092 1201 0.0043 0.0121
Quartile 3 0.0515 0.0311 0.0452 0.0007 0.0305 42 0.0007 0.0023
Quartile 4 (richest) 0.0318 0.0471 0.0193 0.0313 0.0158 41036** 0.0071 0.0035
Rural 0.0564* 0.0675** 0.0026 0.0572** 0.0104 549 0.0011 0.0066
Urban 0.0915* 0.0309 0.0500* 0.0006 0.0303* 12921** 0.0118** 0.0215*
Total 0.0623** 0.0535** 0.0154 0.0384** 0.0151* 4169** 0.0040* 0.0102þ
Statistical signiﬁcance: þ at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent level.
Note: Outcome variables are average number of outpatient visits per household member in last month, OOP health care spending and share of total household spending, and
incidence of CHS in last month. Other covariates in difference equation have been omitted for convenience. Propensity score matching based on Epanechnikov kernel with
a 0.06 bandwidth, and with bootstrapped standard errors (with 200 replications). Quartiles are derived from 2005 per capita expenditure. All results are based on a balanced
panel of 8448 households for 2 years, of which 8379 lie on the region of common support after matching. Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005e2006 household
panel.
Table 8
Sensitivity analysis of Askeskin impact, household ﬁxed effects.
Single
difference
(1)
Difference-in-differences
(2) (3) (4)
Outpatient care 0.0802**
[0.0138]
0.0422*
[0.0182]
0.0623**
[0.0209]
0.0373þ
[0.0197]
Public 0.0714**
[0.0081]
0.0352**
[0.0108]
0.0535**
[0.0125]
0.0435**
[0.0122]
Private 0.0030
[0.0082]
0.0105
[0.0112]
0.0154
[0.0127]
0.0021
[0.0121]
Public health
centre
0.0704**
[0.0066]
0.0293**
[0.0089]
0.0384**
[0.0102]
0.0294**
[0.0099]
Public hospital 0.0011
[0.0047]
0.0059
[0.0061]
0.0151*
[0.0071]
0.0141*
[0.0071]
OOP spending 425.68
[1209.49]
1957.47
[1330.92]
4168.55**
[1540.50]
3914.17*
[1539.92]
OOP share 0.0019
[0.0012]
0.0013
[0.0015]
0.0040*
[0.0018]
0.0035*
[0.0018]
CHS 15% 0.0038
[0.0035]
0.0051
[0.0047]
0.0102þ
[0.0055]
0.0094þ
[0.0055]
Speciﬁcation
Other controlsa No No Yes Yes
Ill last month No No No Yes
Statistical signiﬁcance: þ at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent level.
a Full set of control variables include formal social health insurance coverage
(Askes, Jamsostek), 2005 health card, 2006 UCT, household characteristics (size,
composition, gender and education head of household, housing characteristics,
water access), district Askeskin coverage and province dummy variables. Source:
Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005e2006 household panel.
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urban areas the availability of providers is more varied, and Aske-
skin services seem to have been mainly used for relatively expen-
sive health care services at public hospitals and those private clinics
that have negotiated contracts for Askeskin insurance.
Between population groups the treatment effects vary greatly,
as the distribution of impact is skewed towards the poor. Askeskin
coverage increases utilization of public care for the poorest quartile
by 0.055 visits, while for the richest there seems no impact.
Askeskin coverage seems to increase OOP payments and budget
shares, in particular in urban areas, although the propensity score
matching results show larger standard errors. This suggests that the
Askeskin insured had to bear part of the costs of increased health
care utilization. Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) ﬁnd a similar effect
in China, and argue this is due to provider induced demand and an
increase in more high-tech and expensive care, which is typically
bulky and indivisible. We also ﬁnd some evidence of increased
incidence of catastrophic spending at a 15 percent threshold,
following a pattern consistent to that of OOP spending. However,
the magnitudes are small and the propensity score matching esti-
mates are not statistically signiﬁcant. Note that we ﬁnd similar
impact of catastrophic spending at different catastrophic threshold
levels, although, as expected, the coefﬁcients and level of signiﬁ-
cance increases as the threshold is lowered (details are given in the
Supplementary appendix).
Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to look closer at the
exact sources of this increase in OOP spending. In particular, it will
be important to understand behavioural response by health care
providers and the role of provider payment contracts. This also
points to the need of accurate costing and actuarial analysis, to gain
better insight into required provider compensation, insurance
premiums and government subsides, which will be crucial for the
long term sustainability of the programme.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 8,
showing single difference estimates and various difference-in-
differences speciﬁcations. Column (3) reports the estimates for the
speciﬁcation used in Table 7. The single difference estimates are
twice as large as double difference estimates, suggesting that initialselection was partly based on need. Once we include control vari-
ables to the difference regressions, the estimates increase slightly,
which can be explained by negative selection bias due to targeting
based on socio-economic characteristics. Controlling for self-
reported illness reduces the treatment effects, although these
remainwellwithin one standard deviation for all outcomevariables.
This suggests that the scope for bias due to unobserved changes
in health status is limited, which is further conﬁrmed by the
Rosenbaum bounds test. The test results indicate that unobserved
changes in health status would need to cause the odds ratios of
having Askeskin insurance for the matched treated and controls to
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the treatment effects for health care utilization (detailed results are
provided in the Supplementary appendix). For OOP payments and
catastrophic spending the odds ratios would have to differ by
a factor 1.4 and 1.8, respectively. The bias required to change these
odds ratios by such an extent needs to be considerable and would
be unlikely to occur, given that the observed characteristics do
balance after matching and the sensitivity analysis for the differ-
ence regressions show that the impact estimates are fairly robust to
including information on changes in self-reported health status.
While we acknowledge that this does not constitute a measure for
the presence or extent of any bias, the combined sensitivity tests do
provide a convincing argument that unobserved health shocks are
unlikely to confound our impact estimates.
Conclusion
This paper explores impact of the Indonesian Askeskin pro-
gramme, introduced in 2005 to provide public health insurance for
the poor. We ﬁrst observed that there is indeed scope for public
intervention regarding health insurance, as the Indonesian poor
tend to underutilization of health care services and have a lower
propensity to spend relative to their needs.
Askeskin has been successful in targeting the poor, despite some
non-trivial leakage to the non-poor. In addition, Askeskin seems to
have been allocated proportionally more to individuals that live in
households that are expected to require a relatively high OOP
health care budget share in order to meet health care needs.
There appears to be a strong impact of Askeskin for the poor, as
coverage increases utilization of public outpatient care. However,
OOP health payments have increased slightly in urban areas, which
is most likely due to an increase of relatively more expensive
hospital care for which the costs have not been fully covered by the
Askeskin insurance. The results are robust to choice of method.
As lessons learned for achieving the objective of universal
coverage, however, these results need to be treated cautiously as
there are some qualiﬁcations of this study that need to be taken into
consideration. First, this analysis presents short term impact only. In
2006 targeting of Askeskinwas still expanding. Initial implementa-
tion experienced various problems aswell as confusion on the rights
and obligation of patients and providers. Second, this study does not
look into the supply and quality of public health care. The issues of
inferior quality anddiscrimination of services forAskeskin recipients
were often raised as reason for declining Askeskin.
The ﬁndings also leave questions for future analysis. The
sustainability of this programme is still in doubt, as for universal
coverage it is critical to set a right balance between insurance
premiums and government subsidy. Finally, scaling up social health
insurance needs to take into account possible behavioural response
by providers, and consider adequate provider payment systems so
as to avoid a backlash in the provision of public health care.
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